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I. “HIS BROTHER’S KEEPER”1 
“Christopher Martinez had no idea what was hidden in his parents’ 
apartment, let alone deep in the closets. He isn’t responsible for what the 
police found during their search.” These were the defense attorney’s first 
statements at Mr. Martinez’s trial. 
Mr. Martinez was born and raised in New York City. His parents 
were drug addicts, so Mr. Martinez and his younger brother, Manuel, of-
ten had to fend for themselves to get food and other necessities. In his 
early teens, Mr. Martinez and Manuel got caught up with some other 
young men in their neighborhood and began committing petty crimes to 
earn some quick cash. About fifteen years before his federal trial, at the 
young age of nineteen, Mr. Martinez was the get-away driver for the rob-
bery of a convenience store. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced 
to a short term of imprisonment in state prison. After his release, Mr. Mar-
tinez made substantial life changes: he continued his education, sustained 
steady employment, and started a family. 
Although Mr. Martinez turned his life around and was never con-
victed of another crime, his parents were still addicts, and Manuel picked 
up several state and federal convictions. Mr. Martinez did what he could 
to assist his parents, but to no avail. When his mother became ill in 2013, 
he purchased her a hospital-grade bed, only to find several days later that 
she had sold it in order to buy drugs. Mr. Martinez did not speak or inter-
act with his brother because he knew that Manuel was up to no good, and 
Mr. Martinez wanted nothing to do with this. In 2012, Manuel was sen-
tenced to several years of imprisonment for a federal conviction for sell-
ing guns. 
As his cousin testified for the defense, Mr. Martinez’s parents con-
tinued to live in the same apartment that Mr. Martinez grew up in; it was 
a public housing building, in which his grandparents had previously lived 
before they passed away. Mr. Martinez’s parents lived with his adopted 
sister, Sarah. They were hoarders and kept the apartment rooms, hallways, 
and closets completely full of boxes, garbage bags, and old clothes. In 
2013, Mr. Martinez’s mother died, and his father died several months later 
in 2014. 
When his parents passed away, Mr. Martinez became responsible for 
their apartment, all of their belongings, and Sarah, who was sixteen years 
old and pregnant. Mr. Martinez entered into family court proceedings to 
 
 1 This section is based on a trial that took place in federal district court. I helped the 
defense attorneys prepare pre- and post-trial  motions, and assisted during trial. I have changed 
the name of the defendant and some identifying information because I have added some addi-
tional information that was not presented at trial to better explain the facts in relation to the 
themes and arguments of this paper. 
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adopt Sarah. She was a minor and needed a legal guardian to avoid being 
placed in the foster care system, and Mr. Martinez was the only family 
member willing to become her guardian. Although he lived full-time in 
his home in Queens with his wife and son, Mr. Martinez transferred the 
lease of his parents’ apartment to himself. Mr. Martinez wanted to ensure 
that Sarah and her soon-to-be-born baby could continue to live there. In 
order to do so, he had to qualify as a remaining family member under the 
succession rules of the New York City Housing Authority.2  
During 2015—the year in which the alleged crime occurred—Mr. 
Martinez spent a lot of time in and near his parent’s apartment. He visited 
Sarah and her newborn frequently. He also spent some nights in the apart-
ment to rest after long shifts at work and to avoid the commute. Mr. Mar-
tinez’s job was near the apartment, as was his son’s school. 
Several New York Police Department (“NYPD”) officers testified 
for the prosecution. They first testified that on one evening in the fall of 
2015, while Mr. Martinez and his friend were visiting his parents’ apart-
ment, he and his friend got into an altercation. Sarah called the police and 
when the police arrived, they heard shouting. The police officers knocked 
on the door, and Mr. Martinez told them to come in as the door was un-
locked. The officers opened the apartment door to see broken items on the 
living room floor and Mr. Martinez holding down his friend to restrain 
her from “breaking things,” as the officer testified. The officers then asked 
Mr. Martinez for photo identification and whether this was “his” apart-
ment. He showed his identification, which listed the apartment’s ad-
dress—a requirement to be the leaseholder of a public housing unit. He 
also responded that it was his apartment, and that he lived there with his 
sister and her child. He told the officers which bedroom was his, and 
which bedroom was his sister’s. 
The officers interviewed the friend in the bedroom that Mr. Martinez 
identified as his for approximately forty minutes. At some point, either 
while she was questioned at the apartment or after, Mr. Martinez’s friend 
apparently told the officers that he had threatened her with a gun during 
their argument. Thereafter, she had a psychotic breakdown and was ad-
mitted into a hospital psychiatric unit. Based on her allegations, the police 
officers obtained a search warrant for the apartment where Mr. Martinez’s 
parents had lived. 
The NYPD officers searched the apartment for several hours; for the 
duration, they detained Sarah, her infant, and her boyfriend in the hallway. 
In the bedroom that Mr. Martinez indicated as his, a bag hung on the 
 
 2 See N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., RESIDENT POLICIES & PROCEDURES, OCCUPANCY AND 
SUCCESSION (REMAINING FAMILY MEMBER) POLICY OVERVIEW, http://perma.cc/8TCN-KTLC 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
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closed closet door. This bag contained a carton of take-out food, which 
the officer suspected, from the smell of the food, had been placed there 
very recently by Mr. Martinez. The officer described the closet in which 
she discovered a “green plastic box” containing over one hundred rounds 
of ammunition and a gun cleaning kit. The officer did not take a single 
photograph during her search of the closet. She “forgot to,” as she admit-
ted to the jury. 
The closet was full from top to bottom with hanging clothes and large 
black garbage bags of old items, old purses, and winter clothes. Under a 
briefcase, there was the green plastic box of ammunition. The green plas-
tic box was not visible until all other items were taken out of the closet. 
The briefcase sitting on top of the green plastic box was full of old docu-
ments. Not a single document had Mr. Martinez’s name or other infor-
mation on it. The green plastic box and the gun cleaning kit had no usable 
fingerprints on them to prove that Mr. Martinez had ever touched either 
of these items. The ammunition was not tested for fingerprints. Even so, 
any fingerprints were compromised after the officer organized the ammu-
nition without gloves. 
During the trial, the prosecution presented an expert witness who tes-
tified about the cell-site data for Mr. Martinez’s cell phone during 2015. 
The expert witness explained that cell-site data could not show the exact 
location of a person’s cell phone; it could only estimate the location based 
on distance from the nearest cell towers. Specifically, he explained that 
this data did not show that Mr. Martinez was in his parents’ apartment. 
Rather, the data demonstrated that he was in the “general vicinity,” mean-
ing within a few blocks of the apartment building. Although Mr. Martinez 
had many reasons to be in and near his parents’ apartment in 2015, the 
government argued that because Mr. Martinez was near the apartment al-
most daily, he probably lived in this apartment and, thus, likely kept his 
own personal belongings in this apartment. 
The defense counsel presented photographs of the bedroom after the 
search. These photographs were mostly of large sports jerseys thrown 
onto the bed. The officer had testified that during her search she saw 
mostly old sports jerseys, size XXL or larger, hanging in the closet. The 
defense counsel also presented to the jury some of the sports jerseys that 
were in these photographs. Mr. Martinez’s aunt testified that these sports 
jerseys belonged to Mr. Martinez’s father, not Mr. Martinez. The defense 
counsel also played some of Manuel’s phone calls for the jury. In these 
calls—intercepted from a city jail—Mr. Martinez’s brother described his 
gun selling business to the person on the phone. He bragged about how 
women would go to his parents’ apartment to get guns from his parents’ 
bedroom closet, and he would sell these guns. 
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After the NYPD conducted the search and tested various items for 
fingerprints, the green plastic box of ammunition remained in the police 
precinct for several months. No one was arrested. There were no suspects, 
as no one had committed an offense by keeping a box of ammunition in 
the back of a closet. There was no active case. Eventually, the NYPD 
referred the case to federal agents since Mr. Martinez had previously been 
convicted of a felony. Mr. Martinez was charged with possessing ammu-
nition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal “felon in posses-
sion” statute.3 
After several days of trial, the prosecution summed up its evidence. 
The prosecution needed to prove that Mr. Martinez knew that this ammu-
nition was in his home and they argued that the evidence showed just that: 
Mr. Martinez told the police officer that this was his apartment; he had 
been in the general vicinity of the apartment nearly every day that year; 
and there was take-out food hanging on the closet door which indicated 
that he had recently slept in the room. Moreover, the prosecution empha-
sized, how could Mr. Martinez possibly fail to notice a “green sportsman 
dry box” in his closet? This type of box would be found on a fishing trip, 
the prosecutor noted, not in a small apartment in Manhattan. 
The defense argued that this evidence in no way established that Mr. 
Martinez was aware that the ammunition was hidden in the bottom corner 
of his parents’ bedroom closet: the items in the closet did not belong to 
Mr. Martinez but rather to his parents; Mr. Martinez inherited the mess 
that was in his parents’ apartment and never cleaned out the mess, but let 
his adopted sister live there; there was no physical evidence linking the 
ammunition to Mr. Martinez; and the box was buried under many other 
items—it took even the officers several hours to find the box. 
The jury deliberated for about a day and a half. When they reached 
a verdict, Mr. Martinez, his counsel, and the prosecution, reconvened in 
the courtroom. Mr. Martinez’s aunt fiddled nervously with some rosary 
beads. The foreperson stood up and read aloud the verdict for the single 
count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). “Guilty.” Everyone was 
stunned. After comforting Mr. Martinez and his crying family members, 
the defense team went into the hallway to catch the jury members before 
they left. About five of them agreed to speak. 
“How did you all come to this decision?” They explained that they 
did not think he knew specifically what was in the closet (which is re-
quired), but that he should have known something was in there. They 
came to this conclusion after re-reading the judge’s instruction on 
“knowledge”—one can “know” something if he “deliberately closed his 
 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018) (stating that possession of a firearm or ammunition by a 
person convicted by any court is a crime punishable by imprisonment for over one year). 
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eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.” Also gleaned 
from the judge’s instructions was the idea of “joint possession.” Mr. Mar-
tinez was capable of jointly possessing the items in the closet. They con-
cluded that Mr. Martinez had knowledge—or rather, that he had closed 
his eyes to the obvious—after hearing the recordings of Manuel talking 
about storing guns in that same closet. The foreperson stated, “I under-
stand that Mr. Martinez is not his brother’s keeper, but how could he not 
have thought something, such as guns or bullets, was in that closet if his 
brother was using it for his gun dealing?” 
II. EXAMINING THE “FELON IN POSSESSION” LAWS 
Mr. Martinez was found guilty of being a “felon in possession” not 
because he consciously engaged in illegal conduct, but because he was a 
dependable son and brother. When Mr. Martinez took legal responsibility 
of his sister and vowed to provide her with stable housing, he also became 
legally responsible for the items left behind by his parents. From the per-
spective of the federal prosecutor’s office, someone needed to be pun-
ished for possessing a box of ammunition and solely—by virtue of his 
previous conviction and living situation—that someone was Mr. Mar-
tinez. Unfortunately, given the federal “felon in possession” statute, and 
courts’ interpretation thereof, Mr. Martinez’s conviction is not at all sur-
prising. Indeed, given his race, and that this alleged offense occurred in a 
city with a dense population of minorities, convictions and circumstances 
like that of Mr. Martinez are overwhelmingly typical. 
A. Elements of the Crime: “Felon in Possession” 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), otherwise known as the “felon in 
possession” law: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in 
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has 
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.4 
This federal offense has many elements, so it is important to begin 
by explaining what the government must prove to obtain a conviction. 
 
 4 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018) (“What consti-
tutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the juris-
diction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set 
aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be 
considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter . . . .”). 
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Indeed, what the government does not need to prove is quite telling about 
how courts have broadly interpreted this statute, and other connected stat-
utes, to penalize a wide breadth of conduct. 
The government need only prove three elements to convict someone 
under the “felon in possession” law.5 First, the government must prove 
that the defendant was previously “convicted in any court of, a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”6 “Any court” 
means any domestic state or federal court, not a foreign one.7 The actual 
sentence that the defendant received for the prior conviction is irrelevant; 
the only inquiry is “whether the prior conviction could have included a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year, i.e., whether the statutory max-
imum was in excess of one year.”8 As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, 
even a sentence of probation falls under the purview of a qualifying con-
viction.9 Moreover, many circuits have held that the government does not 
need to prove that the defendant knew he had previously been convicted 
of a felony.10 Therefore, defendants who may have been confused about 
the outcome of a previous criminal case—perhaps because they received 
a sentence of probation rather than jail or prison time—cannot claim ig-
norance of the law and avoid a conviction under this statute.11 
Second, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly 
possessed the firearm or ammunition specified in the indictment.12 The 
“felon in possession” law states: “Whoever knowingly violates [this 
law] . . . shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 
10 years, or both.”13 Although a plain reading of this statute implies that 
a defendant must know that they committed the crime, many circuits have 
held that possession is the only element for which knowledge is re-
quired.14 Essentially, in regards to the mens rea, the government only 
 
 5 Kevin A. McDonald, Note, Felon in Possession Sentencing Under the Federal Guide-
lines, Considering State Sentences, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 106, 111 (2011); see also United 
States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 6 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). 
 7 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005) (reversing conviction under 
§ 922(g)(1) where defendant’s felony conviction was imposed by a court in Japan). 
 8 McDonald, supra note 5. 
 9 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst. Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 114 (1983) (affirming conviction 
under § 922(g)(1) for defendant who had successfully served probationary term imposed for 
conviction of felony punishable by maximum of five-year imprisonment). 
 10 United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). 
 11 Id. at 1142. 
 12 United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir. 1998). Shipping, transporting, 
and receiving any firearm or ammunition are also proscribed by this statute, but these acts are 
not the focus of this article. See 18 U.S.C.    § 922(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
 13 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 14 See Games-Perez, 667 F.3d at 1140. 
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needs to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed an instrument that 
he knew was a firearm or ammunition.15 
Third, the government must prove that the defendant’s possession 
“was in or affecting interstate commerce.”16 To do so, the government 
need only demonstrate that the firearm or ammunition “travelled in inter-
state commerce,” which means that the firearm or ammunition “had once 
crossed a state line.”17 This can be accomplished by establishing that the 
firearm or ammunition “was manufactured in a state other than that in 
which it was found.”18 Because mens rea does not apply to this element, 
as discussed above, “a defendant’s knowledge or ignorance of the inter-
state nexus is irrelevant,” and, therefore, the government need not prove 
that the defendant knew the firearm or ammunition he possessed had trav-
eled in interstate commerce.19 
Within the second element of “knowingly possessed,” “firearm” and 
“possession” are sub-elements that must be explained further. To begin, 
for the purpose of this statute, “firearm” is defined as “any weapon (in-
cluding a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be con-
verted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive . . . .”20 As such, 
a defendant may be convicted as a “felon in possession” for possessing a 
firearm that is unloaded and seized without officers ever discovering am-
munition to be used with that firearm.21 Moreover, in contemplation of 
the words “which will or is designed to,” each circuit that has considered 
the issue of whether an inoperable firearm falls within the statute’s defi-
nition of a firearm has concluded that it indeed does.22 As the Second 
Circuit has explained: 
Where a weapon designed to fire a projectile is rendered inopera-
ble, whether on purpose or by accident, it is not removed from the 
 
 15 See id.; see also United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 16 Daniel, 134 F.3d at 1263. 
 17 United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Scarborough v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 563, 567 n.5 (1977)). 
 18 McDonald, supra note 5, at 112 n.49 (citing United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 
1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The evidence in this case was undisputed that defendant’s guns were 
manufactured in Massachusetts and found in California. Consequently, . . . the evidence [was] 
sufficient . . . .”)). 
 19 United States v. Kirsh, 54 F.3d 1062, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Dancy, 861 F.2d at 
81). 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) (2018). 
 21 See, e.g., United States v. Sneed, 742 F.3d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming sentence 
for defendant convicted in part for possession of an unloaded firearm found in his car, and 
where no ammunition was found). 
 22 United States v. Rivera, 415 F.3d 284, 286 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
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statute’s purview; although it is temporarily incapable of effecting 
its purpose, it continues to be “designed” to fire a projectile.23 
As such, a defendant who knowingly possesses a non-functioning fire-
arm—and thus cannot cause harm—may nevertheless violate the “felon 
in possession” statute. 
Next, courts have interpreted the statute’s use of “possession” to 
comprise both “actual” and “constructive” possession.24 As the U.S. Su-
preme Court explained, “[a]ctual possession exists when a person has di-
rect physical control over a thing,” and “[c]onstructive possession is es-
tablished when a person, though lacking such physical custody, still has 
the power and intent to exercise control over the object.”25 Actual or con-
structive possession is not limited to one person; possession over an item 
can be joint with two or more people.26 Moreover, the length of time in 
which the defendant allegedly possesses a firearm or ammunition is irrel-
evant. As the First Circuit held, “[e]ven if the evidence established only 
that [the defendant] held the firearm for a few seconds, he could properly 
be convicted of possession within the meaning of [the statute].”27 
Constructive possession encompasses many circumstances. It in-
cludes any situation in which another person actually possesses a firearm 
or ammunition and that person is “willing to give the felon access to [the 
firearm or ammunition] or to accede to the felon’s instructions about the[] 
future use [of the firearm or ammunition].”28 Moreover, constructive pos-
session can be established through circumstantial evidence if the defend-
ant exercised dominion and control “over the premises in which the [con-
traband is] located.”29 Therefore, even if the defendant does not have the 
means of physical access—such as the key to unlock a padlock or door—
to the room/area in which the firearm or ammunition is kept, the court 
may still find that the defendant constructively possessed the firearm or 
ammunition if he exercised ownership, dominion, or control over the 
premises as a whole.30 In fact, some courts have chipped away at the gov-
ernment’s evidentiary burden. The government is merely “required to 
 
 23 Id. (citing United States v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 24 Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015). 
 25 Id. 
 26 2A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 39:12 (6th ed. 2018). 
 27 United States v. Mercado, 412 F.3d 243, 251 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 28 Henderson, 135 S. Ct. at 1784. 
 29 United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 676 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 571 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Balanga, 109 F.3d 1299, 1301 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming 
conviction for § 922(g)(1) where defendant alleged he did not possess a key to his basement 
door’s padlock where his brother stored firearms). 
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show some nexus between [the defendant] and the firearms and ammuni-
tion.”31 As such, “the conviction depends on whether ‘there [is] some ev-
idence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had 
knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.’”32 
Finally, and perhaps most disconcertingly, the government may pre-
sent a theory of “deliberate ignorance” in order to convict a defendant.33 
Constructive possession requires that the defendant must have the power 
and intent to exercise control over the object, and thus “a defendant must, 
in fact, know of the [object’s] existence in order to exercise dominion and 
control over it.”34 As a result, constructive possession requires a “know-
ing exercise of or the knowing power or right to exercise dominion and 
control over the [object].”35 Despite this clear law, “conscious avoidance” 
can be used to show that a defendant constructively possessed a firearm 
or ammunition; “knowledge of a criminal fact may be established where 
the defendant consciously avoided learning the fact while aware of a high 
probability of its existence.”36 Where the facts give rise to such an instruc-
tion, most circuits hold that the court give the following model federal 
jury charge: 
In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may 
consider whether the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to 
what would otherwise have been obvious to him. If you find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with (or that the 
defendant’s ignorance was solely and entirely the result of) a con-
scious purpose to avoid learning the truth . . . , then this element 
may be satisfied. However, guilty knowledge may not be estab-
lished by demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent, 
foolish or mistaken. If you find that the defendant was aware of a 
high probability that . . . and that the defendant acted with delib-
erate disregard of the facts, you may find the defendant acted 
knowingly. However, if you find that the defendant actually be-
lieved that . . . , he may not be convicted.37 
 
 31 United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 32 Id. (quoting United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis 
added)); see United States v. Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033, 1041 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The government 
must ‘establish a nexus between the accused and the contraband, in order to distinguish the 
accused from a mere bystander.’”). 
 33 See, e.g., United States v. Little, 829 F.3d 1177, 1185 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 34 United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 834 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 35 United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 657 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United 
States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 36 United States v. Sicignano, 78 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 37 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL ¶ 3A.01 
3A-2 (Matthew Bender 2012). 
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Therefore, “knowing exercise of or the knowing power or right to 
exercise dominion and control over the [object]” can be proven if the de-
fendant consciously avoided learning the truth about the existence of an 
object over which he possibly could have exercised dominion and control, 
had he not consciously avoided learning the truth about the existence of 
that object.38 
B. What These Laws Seek to Prevent and Punish: Criminalizing the 
Status of Being a Felon, Rather Than Harmful Action 
The first federal statute preventing felons from possessing firearms 
was enacted in 1938, under the Federal Firearms Act.39 It prohibited the 
possession of a firearm or ammunition by any person who had been con-
victed of a “crime of violence” or was a “fugitive from justice.”40 A 
“crime of violence” was demarcated within this Act by several specific 
offenses, such as murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, and assault 
with intent to kill, rape, or rob.41 
The Federal Firearms Act was amended in 1968 and replaced with 
the Gun Control Act42 —which includes the “felon in possession” statute 
as it exists today. The “history of the 1968 Act reflects a similar concern 
with keeping firearms out of the hands of categories of potentially irre-
sponsible persons, including convicted felons.”43 In enacting this Act, 
Congress explicitly noted that those previously convicted of a felony 
“may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to 
society.”44 The assumption is: 
[P]ossession of a gun gives rise to some risk that the gun may be 
used in an act of violence. By definition, without possessing a 
gun, one cannot use a gun for the commission of a violent act; 
with a gun, one can. Possession of a gun greatly increases one’s 
ability to inflict harm on others and therefore involves some risk 
of violence.45 
 
 38 See Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d at 657 (quoting Poole, 878 F.2d at 1392). 
 39 Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by Nonviolent 
Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 113 (2013) (citing Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 
75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968)). 
 40 Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 2, 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (repealed 
1968). 
 41 Id. at 1250. 
 42 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 43 Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 220 (1976). 
 44 Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 
13,868, 14,773 (1968)). 
 45 United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000)(emphasis in original). 
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Based on the assumptions underlying the “felon in possession” stat-
ute, it is clear that this statute criminalizes a possibility of harm rather 
than actual harm.46 Consequently, the statute “serve[s] as a means of reg-
ulating dangerous products,” and presumptively dangerous persons, “just 
as much as (if not more so than) dangerous conduct.”47 By regulating the 
simple possession of potentially “dangerous products” within only a dis-
tinct group of people, i.e., those who have previously been convicted of a 
felony, the statute proscribes a “status offense” rather than an “action 
crime.”48 A “status offense” is “[a] crime of which a person is guilty by 
being in a certain condition or of a specific character.”49 Those previously 
convicted of a felony—regardless of the underlying violent or non-violent 
conduct of that felon—are categorically considered a threat for the rest of 
their lives. Their status of being a criminal in turn makes otherwise lawful 
acts (like possessing a firearm or ammunition) unlawful. 
Moreover, the “felon in possession” statute is in essence a strict lia-
bility crime.50 This offense penalizes the alleged possessor’s status as a 
felon by criminalizing his presence in a home in which a firearm or am-
munition is found.51 Although the government must prove that the de-
fendant “knowingly” possessed the firearm or ammunition,52 this pur-
ported knowledge is assumed where the government demonstrates “some 
nexus between [the defendant] and the firearms and ammunition,”53 as 
discussed above. This nexus, which establishes constructive possession, 
is most commonly proven by a defendant’s residency.54 As long as the 
government can show that the defendant resided in, or at some point “oc-
cupied,” the home in which the firearm or ammunition is found, the gov-
ernment need not prove any knowledge on the defendant’s part that the 
firearm or ammunition was stored in the home.55 For example, “docu-
ments, receipts, photographs, and identification cards bearing [the de-
fendant’s] likeness and name” found in plain view during a search will 
provide sufficient evidence for constructive possession of a “handgun 
 
 46 Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2205 (2016). 
 47 Id. at 2214. 
 48 Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal 
Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 920 (2001); see also United States v. Leviner, 31 F. 
Supp. 2d 23, 26 n.5 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 49 Status Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 50 See Dubber, supra note 48, at 859. 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 52 See, e.g., United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 53 United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 54 See, e.g., Shorter, 328 F.3d at 172; United States v. Surratt, 172 F.3d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
 55 See Shorter, 328 F.3d at 171-72. 
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[found] inside a hall closet, concealed in a car battery having a false lid.”56 
Similarly, a single “bill addressed to [the defendant] at the apartment,” 
where he presumably lived with his wife, is sufficient to link the defend-
ant to the residence, and thus sufficient to prove constructive possession 
of a “pistol in a bedside table and a shotgun in a box in the kitchen pan-
try.”57 
In some cases, persons previously convicted of a crime will be con-
victed under the “felon in possession” statute for having a connection to 
the residence, even where their residency or occupation of the premises is 
not proven.58 Therefore, this offense penalizes the alleged possessor’s sta-
tus as a felon by criminalizing his relationship with those who live in the 
home in which a firearm or ammunition is found. In United States v. 
Spruill, the Second Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to con-
vict the defendant under the “felon in possession” statute.59 The govern-
ment proved that the defendant “regularly stored his belongings in the 
attic; that additional garbage bags were found in the attic containing [his] 
clothing; and that nearby garbage bags were found in the attic containing 
a bulletproof vest, three handguns, and four boxes of ammunition.”60 Alt-
hough the attic was in the building where the defendant’s girlfriend lived, 
and not the defendant, the court found that based on this evidence of gar-
bage bags only, “a rational trier of fact [could] find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [the defendant] had the power and intention to exercise domin-
ion and control over the firearms found in the attic.”61 In another Second 
Circuit case, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed, even though the 
“dismantled .38 caliber revolver and three live .38 caliber bullets” were 
found in “a bag on top of a dresser” in the defendant’s mother’s home, 
and the defendant’s mother testified that the firearm belonged to her.62 
Constructive possession was based on the defendant’s testimony that “he 
told the police his mother owned a revolver so as to cooperate with the 
investigation,” and his mother’s testimony that the defendant occasionally 
spent the night at her home.63 
 
 56 See Surratt, 172 F.3d at 562. 
 57 See Shorter, 328 F.3d at 171. 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Spruill, 634 F. App’x. 312, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary 
order), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 407 (2016); United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 59 See Spruill, 634 F. App’x. at 314. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Payton, 159 F.3d at 53-54. 
 63 See id. at 54. Additionally, the defendant testified that he lived with “his wife and chil-
dren, and that he was only visiting [his mother’s home] on the night of the search.” Id. 
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As exhibited, persons who have previously been convicted of a fel-
ony are assumed to pose a risk to others and to be engaging in criminal 
activity just by their status and “nexus” with a firearm and/or ammuni-
tion.64 Mere possession of a firearm or ammunition—especially of am-
munition on its own or inoperable firearms—presents harm to no one, but 
is treated as presenting a harm to others because of the criminal history of 
the person who allegedly possesses the item. Puzzlingly, other federal 
statutes criminalize the sale or transportation, by persons other than li-
censed dealers, of inherently dangerous weapons, but not the mere pos-
session of such weapons.65 These weapons are those which have no pur-
pose other than to cause great injury or death to others: destructive 
devices, machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled ri-
fles.66 Because mere possession encompasses such a broad range of con-
duct—much more than the sale or transportation of a weapon—these in-
herently dangerous weapons statutes underscore the paradox of the “felon 
in possession” statute: there is a hyper-concern for the passive and harm-
less conduct of felons, but a decreased concern for the intrinsically violent 
conduct of non-felons. 
Finally, the fact that the “felon in possession” statute criminalizes 
merely a status rather than a harmful action is blatantly emphasized by 
the mandatory minimums of imprisonment imposed for offenses during 
which a firearm is present. Pursuant to the federal criminal code that sets 
out the penalties for each offense, there is a five-year mandatory mini-
mum when the defendant possesses a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
violence or drug trafficking, a seven-year mandatory minimum if the fire-
arm is “brandished” during such a crime, and a ten-year mandatory mini-
mum if the firearm is “discharged.”67 Any person sentenced under this 
provision a “second or subsequent” time faces a mandatory minimum of 
 
 64 See United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 65 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) (2018) makes it unlawful for “any person, other than a licensed 
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, to transport in interstate 
or foreign commerce any destructive device, machinegun, . . . short-barreled shotgun, or 
short-barreled rifle . . . .” Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4) (2018), it is also unlawful for “any 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or de-
liver . . . to any person any destructive device, machinegun, . . . short-barreled shotgun, or 
short-barreled rifle . . . .” 
 66 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(4), 922(b)(4). 
 67 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2018). The interpretation of how one “uses,” “carries,” or 
possesses “in furtherance of any such crime” a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is not 
universally defined. The U.S. Supreme Court and many courts of appeals have addressed the 
definitions of these actions under certain circumstances, and there is not a single approach. 
See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1995); United States v. Henry, 819 
F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2010). How-
ever, while the interpretation of this statute certainly affects the sentencing of a “felon in pos-
session,” a further discussion of the various interpretations is outside the purview of this paper. 
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twenty-five years’ imprisonment, regardless of how the firearm is used, 
i.e., possessed, brandished, or discharged.68 As for the inherently danger-
ous weapons discussed above, any person sentenced under this provision 
who possessed “a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiau-
tomatic assault weapon,” faces a mandatory minimum of ten years’ im-
prisonment, and if the person possessed instead a “machinegun or a de-
structive device,” he faces a mandatory minimum of thirty years’ 
imprisonment.69 Where the person is convicted under this provision a 
“second or subsequent” time and possessed a “machinegun or a destruc-
tive device,” he will be sentenced to imprisonment for life.70 
Thus, a person previously convicted of a felony who uses or pos-
sesses a firearm to commit or during the commission of “a crime of vio-
lence or drug trafficking crime” is not only subject to conviction and the 
associated punishment under the “felon in possession” statute, but also 
faces a mandatory minimum of five, seven, or ten years’ imprisonment 
for the use of that firearm.71 If he uses an inherently dangerous weapon, 
these mandatory minimums are even greater. If the fear is that persons 
previously convicted of a felony are more dangerous than others, and even 
more dangerous when able to possess a firearm and/or ammunition, or 
when in the presence of a firearm and/or ammunition, then the mandatory 
minimums provided under the federal criminal code sufficiently address 
this fear and deter possibly harmful conduct. 
III. UNEQUAL AND RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE CRIME CONTROL 
EFFORTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF “FELON IN POSSESSION” LAWS 
A. Those Previously Convicted of a Felony are Disproportionately Black 
The “felon in possession” statute only applies to those previously 
convicted of a felony in any domestic court.72 On its face, this law is 
clearly race-neutral. However, when analyzing the rates at which Blacks 
are arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of felony offenses, in comparison 
to those of whites, it is apparent that this law disparately affects Black 
populations. 
The United States has the highest per capita prison population in the 
world.73 Black males are overrepresented in the prison population, which 
 
 68 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). 
 69 Id. at § 924(c)(1)(B). 
 70 Id. at § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 71 Id. at § 924(c)(1)(A). 
 72 See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005). 
 73 See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/TK22-2CL2. There are currently over 2.2 million people in-
carcerated in the United States. Id. 
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is disproportionate to the percentage of Blacks in the general population.74 
To clarify, prisons, rather than jails, are typically facilities in which per-
sons convicted of felonies spend their term of incarceration.75 Since 1850, 
when the first prison statistics were published, it has been evident that 
Blacks are overrepresented in state and federal prisons.76 Despite the low 
general national population, “the combined percentage of . . . [B]lacks 
and other minority groups incarcerated by the criminal justice system has 
ranged between 40% and 50% of all inmates present.”77 For example, in 
1923, not long before the federal “felon in possession” law was enacted, 
people who are Black made up only 10% of the national population, but 
31% of the national prison population; this same year, whites made up 
nearly 90% of the general population, but only 68% of the national prison 
population.78 
Over the years, the Black prison population has steadily increased at 
a faster rate than their proportion of the general population, while the 
white prison population has decreased more in line with their slow de-
crease in the general population.79 The Black prison population had risen 
from 31% in 1923 to 34% by 1950, while Blacks as a portion of the gen-
eral population remained around 10%; over the same period, the white 
prison population decreased from 68% to 65% while white people re-
mained at about 90% of the general prison population.80 Ten years later, 
by 1960, the Black prison population had risen, yet again, to 37%, while 
their representation of the general population only rose to 10.5%.81 In that 
decade, the white prison population decreased to 61%, but the general 
white population decreased by a little over one percent to 88.6%.82 With 
the rising levels of incarcerated Blacks in the 1960s, the federal govern-
 
 74 See Janice Williams, White Men Vs. Black Men Prison Statistics 2016: Why Are More 
African American Males Incarcerated?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2016, 11:41 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8EPP-NWXR. 
 75 See FAQ Detail: What Is the Difference Between Jails and Prisons?, BUREAU JUSTICE 
STAT., https://perma.cc/U5JN-F7QJ (last visited May 18, 2018). 
 76 Robert Johnson, Ania Dobrzanska & Seri Palla, The American Prison in Historical 
Perspective: Race, Gender, and Adjustment, in PRISONS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 23 (Joycelyn 
M. Pollock ed., 2005), https://perma.cc/DJ8F-JNMW; see also MARGARET WERNER 
CAHALAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS 
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 92 (1986), https://perma.cc/A2DK-EXJ3. 
 77 Johnson, Dobrzanska & Palla, supra note 76, at 23. 
 78 See CAHALAN, supra note 76, at 64; see also FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY: CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL 
REPORTS 77 (2002), https://perma.cc/3BJB-MEK3. 
 79 See CAHALAN, supra note 76, at 64; see also HOBBS & STOOPS, supra note 78, at 77. 
 80 See CAHALAN, supra note 76, at 65; see also HOBBS & STOOPS, supra note 78, at 77. 
 81 See CAHALAN, supra note 76, at 65; see also HOBBS & STOOPS, supra note 78, at 77. 
 82 See CAHALAN, supra note 76, at 65; see also HOBBS & STOOPS, supra note 78, at 77. 
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ment passed the Gun Control Act of 1968—a harsher “felon in posses-
sion” law compared to its predecessor—the Federal Firearms Act of 
1938.83 
This disproportionate rate of incarceration of Blacks has continued 
in the last half century and continues today. In 2015, approximately 
13.3% of the national population was Black, but the national state prison 
population consisted of 38% Black male inmates.84 The federal prison 
population of Black inmates was nearly the same at 37.8%.85 In the same 
year, white males made up approximately 77% of the national population, 
and the national white population in state prisons was less than that of the 
national Black population in state prisons at 35%.86 The federal prison 
population of white inmates was slightly higher at 58.7%.87 Overall, it is 
estimated that Blacks are five times more likely than whites to be incar-
cerated in a prison at some point in their lives.88 
Imprisonment rates for drug charges are even more imbalanced. In 
2003, for example, Blacks comprised approximately 12% of the national 
population, and 14% of drug users and sellers, as reported on national 
household surveys.89 In the same year, 34% of those arrested for drug 
offenses were Black, and 45% of the national state prison population serv-
ing a period of incarceration for a drug offense were Black.90 As such, 
Black men were about twelve times more likely to serve a period of im-
prisonment for a felony drug offense than white men.91 Clearly, Blacks—
and Black men in particular—are much more likely to have been con-
victed of a felony than whites. 
B. Federally Endorsed Disparate Treatment of Black Communities 
The pre-existing disproportionate numbers of Blacks who have been 
convicted of a felony translates into similarly disproportionate numbers 
of Blacks who are convicted under the federal “felon in possession” law. 
For example, in fiscal year 2015, 51% of all persons convicted under the 
 
 83 See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (prohibiting all con-
victed felons, drug users and mentally ill people from buying guns, raising the age to purchase 
drugs to 21, and expanding licensing requirements). Cf. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. 
L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (prohibiting only people under indictment and convicted of 
crimes of violence from buying guns and requiring gun dealers to record their sales). 
 84 Williams, supra note 74. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Marc Mauer & David Cole, Five Myths About Incarceration, WASH. POST (June 17, 
2011), http://perma.cc/GXX4-E9J8. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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law were Black, while only 26.1% were white.92 However, the dispropor-
tionate rates at which Blacks are convicted of felonies—and thus suscep-
tible to a “felon in possession” charge—are only a small component of 
why Blacks are disparately affected by federal “felon in possession” laws. 
Federal programs have existed for twenty-six years to ensure the 
most aggressive enforcement of gun laws and have been set up to system-
ically target Black communities.93 All states have their own penal law 
similar to the federal “felon in possession” statute.94 In 1991, the Attorney 
General of the Bush Sr. Administration announced “Project Trigger-
lock.”95 Under this program, the U.S. Attorneys’ offices allocated addi-
tional resources to prosecute gun offenses with local law enforcement 
agencies.96 The program primarily focused on the enforcement of the fed-
eral “felon in possession” law.97 The program was implemented in just 
several jurisdictions within the country.98 The Criminal Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice directed the U.S. Attorney from each district 
to create a task force between federal, state, and local representatives to 
establish and develop an enforcement strategy.99 
The U.S. Attorneys’ offices collaborated with local police depart-
ments to prosecute offenders brought in by police officers in federal court, 
where the offenders “would face ‘the full force of federal sentences with 
a commitment to no plea bargaining.’”100 The intended goal was to “pro-
tect the public by putting the most dangerous offenders in prison for as 
long as the law allows.”101 Indeed, federal sentences for gun offenses, 
such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) or the “felon in possession” statute, are 
 
 92 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 1, 
http://perma.cc/8QKA-RH26. Of all persons convicted of this offense, 98.4% were male. Id. 
 93 See Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Tar-
gets Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 305 (2007). 
 94 Professor Gardner reported in her 2007 article Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-
on-Guns Program Targets Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, that all states 
except Vermont have laws prohibiting persons previously convicted of a felony from pos-
sessing a firearm. Id. at 314. In 2015, Vermont passed a bill that makes firearm possession a 
misdemeanor by a person previously convicted of a violent or drug trafficking felony. See 
Morgan True, Senate OKs Bill That Prohibits Certain Criminals from Owning Guns, 
VTDIGGER (Mar. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/LY7W-R6AG. 
 95 Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement 
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 374 (2001). 
 96 Id. at 374-75. 
 97 David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentenc-
ing, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1440 (2011). 
 98 Gardner, supra note 93, at 309. 
 99 Richman, supra note 95, at 374-75. 
 100 See id. at 374 (quoting AP, Thornburgh Orders Drive on Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 27, 1991), http://perma.cc/4E6G-55MK). 
 101 See id. (citation omitted). 
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more severe, resulting in terms of incarceration far longer than their state 
counterparts.102 Within the first six months of project Triggerlock’s an-
nouncement, over 2,600 defendants were charged under the federal “felon 
in possession” law nationwide.103 
Based on the concept and perceived successes of Project Trigger-
lock, the U.S. Attorney of the Eastern District of Virginia began its own 
sub-project, Project Exile, in 1997.104 The U.S. Attorney was determined 
to prosecute “all felons with guns,” so that these offenders would be held 
without bail under federal bond statutes, subjected to lengthier incarcera-
tion terms under federal law, and “‘exiled’ to federal prison,” rather than 
be able to serve time closer to their communities.105 Similar to Project 
Triggerlock, local police departments in the Eastern District of Virginia 
would review the firearm possession crimes and determine whether the 
conduct violated a federal crime, mainly the “felon in possession” statute 
and the statute that criminalizes the possession of a firearm during a crime 
of violence or drug trafficking.106 If the conduct allegedly violated federal 
law, the police department would refer the case to the United States At-
torney for the Eastern District of Virginia.107 Essentially, a state police 
officer was initially responsible for informing federal prosecutorial offi-
cials, and then the case would be diverted from state to federal court, sub-
ject to the United States Attorney’s review and discretion.108 After two 
years of the project’s implementation, the district had obtained 302 “felon 
in possession” convictions.109 Additionally, the average incarceration sen-
tences were over fifty-three months, or at least four and a half years.110 
Project Exile’s extreme racial disparities in federal prosecution was 
clearly discussed in United States v. Jones by a three-judge panel of the 
Eastern District of Virginia court.111 In 1998, Chad Ramon Jones, a Black 
resident of Richmond, Virginia, was charged in state court for violating 
several state criminal laws.112 However, Mr. Jones’s case was transferred 
to federal court as a result of Project Exile.113 Mr. Jones moved to dismiss 
the indictment based on the argument, inter alia, that Project Exile re-
sulted in selective federal prosecution based on race and thus violated his 
 
 102 Patton, supra note 97, at 1440, 1442. 
 103 See Richman, supra note 95, at 375. 
 104 See Gardner, supra note 93, at 309. 
 105 See id. at 309-10 (citation omitted). 
 106 United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 311-12. 
 109 Gardner, supra note 93, at 310. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 311-13. 
 112 Id. at 306-07. 
 113 Id. at 307. 
162 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:2 
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.114 
“Constrained by equal protection and selective prosecution case law,”115 
the court ultimately denied Mr. Jones’ motion to dismiss. The court nev-
ertheless “t[ook] th[e] opportunity to express . . . concern about the dis-
cretion afforded individuals who divert cases from state to federal court 
for prosecution under Project Exile.”116 The court stated, “[t]he inability 
of the prosecutors to explain the procedure clearly is disquieting and casts 
some doubt on the assertion that race places no role in deciding whether 
a particular case is to be federally prosecuted.”117 Moreover, the court ex-
plained the resulting racial disparities of federal prosecution: 
Prosecutors have implemented Project Exile in Richmond and 
Norfolk . . . . [T]he population of each [city] is substantially Afri-
can-American. In these areas, federal firearms statutes are aggres-
sively enforced. The same statutes, however, are rarely enforced 
in more rural areas of the [same district]. This geographic vari-
ance means that defendants charged with firearms offenses in out-
lying areas of the [district], who are more likely to be Caucasian, 
evade federal prosecution . . . [for] identical conduct. Addition-
ally, the record is that approximately ninety percent of the Project 
Exile defendants are African-American. Accordingly, there is lit-
tle doubt that Project Exile has a disparate impact on African-
American defendants.118 
Although the court found that there was a disparate impact on Black de-
fendants, it stated that it was “unwilling to ascribe an unconstitutional in-
tent to those responsible for Project Exile absent clear evidence of a ra-
cially discriminatory intent.”119 
Despite the justices’ unambiguous concerns regarding Project Exile, 
the project continued, and was supported by both Democrats and Repub-
licans.120 In 1999, the same year that United States v. Jones was decided, 
the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) contributed $125,000 to adver-
 
 114 See Gardner, supra note 93, at 311. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 117 Id. at 311 n.9. 
 118 Id. at 312 (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. at 313. 
 120 Gardner, supra note 93, at 310. Project Triggerlock continued despite the change in 
presidential administration. Under the Clinton Administration, the federal program “remained 
‘in full force,’” and in fact was explained to be “an ‘important component’ of the Anti-Violent 
Crime Initiative,” which was announced in 1994. Richman, supra note 95, at 375-76 (quoting 
Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal 
Justice of the H. Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 4 (1994)). 
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tise for Project Exile and the NRA’s President applauded the federal pros-
ecutors during hearings on the project.121 NRA opponents and gun control 
advocates also supported the project.122 Between 1991 and 2001, while 
Project Triggerlock and Project Exile were enforced, federal prosecutions 
under the “felon in possession” law doubled.123 The projects were deemed 
successes and were the “footprint” for today’s national program, “Project 
Safe Neighborhoods.”124 
Project Safe Neighborhoods started in May 2001 under the Bush Jr. 
Administration.125 The Administration allocated more than $900 million 
for the first three years of the program, primarily to hire additional Assis-
tant U.S. Attorneys and ATF agents (agents of the Justice Department’s 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives).126 The national 
federal firearm prosecutions increased by approximately 73% from 2000 
to 2005.127 
Project Safe Neighborhoods, much like Project Exile, as determined 
in United States v. Jones, targets Black communities and disparately im-
pacts Black defendants.128 This disparate impact is evidenced by two 
practices: the targeted implementation of this project in certain jurisdic-
tional districts, and the federal prosecutors’ imbalanced exercise of their 
discretion to remove cases from state court and to indict under the might 
of federal law. First, the districts in which this project is implemented are 
disproportionately Black.129 More than half of the national Black popula-
tion lives in thirty metropolitan areas.130 Project Safe Neighborhoods tar-
gets every single one of these thirty metropolitan areas, which have the 
largest Black populations of all metropolitan areas.131 Moreover, of the 
fifty-four cities with populations exceeding 100,000—where African 
Americans make up 30% or more of the population—Project Safe Neigh-
borhoods focuses on at least forty-four of those communities.132 Of these 
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metropolitan areas, people who are Black make up 30% or more of the 
population, but make up less than 14% of the national population.133 
Second, defendants whose cases are removed from state court are 
disproportionately Black as well.134 For example, in the Eastern District 
of Michigan, nearly 90% of defendants prosecuted under federal law 
through Project Safe Neighborhoods are Black.135 Over 80% of defend-
ants prosecuted under federal law through Project Safe Neighborhoods in 
the Southern District of New York are Black.136 Under Cincinnati’s Pro-
ject Safe Neighborhood’s initiative, over 90% of all defendants are 
Black.137 Despite numerous cases in many of these targeted districts, in 
which defendants raise arguments of selective prosecution resulting from 
Project Safe Neighborhoods, these defendants do not see relief.138 The 
nationwide pursuit to prosecute these offenses under the clout of federal 
law continues, and the harsh sentences are imposed, as the Project guar-
antees.139 
IV. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE RACIALLY-MOTIVATED HISTORY OF GUN 
LAWS AND CRIME CONTROL 
A. The Early History of Disarming Blacks 
In the context of the social and legal history of the United States, it 
is not surprising that federal gun control laws are overbroad, criminalize 
even innocent behavior, and are disparately enforced against Black com-
munities. Indeed, since the first colonists set foot on the New World, fire-
arm and weapon control laws were enacted to suppress the enslaved and 
free Black populations.140 
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The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was interpreted to 
confer upon individuals the right to keep and bear arms,141 “arms” mean-
ing weapons, including firearms.142 However, this amendment was never 
intended or construed—until the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment—
to confer a right onto Blacks.143 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Roger B. 
Taney unequivocally stated in 1857 how the Court, the states, and the 
majority of people at the time understood the rights of people who were 
Black under the Constitution and summarized the common fear of the 
supposed chaos that would result were rights provided.144 Justice Taney 
wrote: 
[Were the Constitution interpreted to include Blacks within the 
meaning of citizens or the people,] [i]t would give to persons of 
the negro race . . . the full liberty of speech in public and in pri-
vate . . . ; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to 
keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would 
be done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free 
and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordina-
tion among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the 
State.145 
“A well regulated Militia,” for which people should have the right to 
“keep and bear Arms,” has always existed in this nation.146 Given the laws 
and political philosophy in England, which deemed the “natural right of 
resistance and self-preservation” a primary right,147 colonists formed mi-
litias as soon as they arrived in the New World.148 The colonists, specifi-
cally white male landowners, strongly believed that militia service was a 
duty within their civic responsibilities.149 As such, all free men were au-
tomatically enlisted at the age of sixteen and were thereafter required to 
own a suitable gun and report to military duty when called by the colonial 
 
 141 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 595 (2008). The Second Amendment 
provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 142 District of Columbia, 554 U.S. at 581. 
 143 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857), superseded by consti-
tutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. (emphasis added). 
 146 See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 147 Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 323 (1991) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 143-44 (1st ed. 1765)). 
 148 WALDMAN, supra note 140, at 8. 
 149 Id. at 7. 
166 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:2 
governments.150 Initially, militias were viewed as necessary to protect 
against Native Americans.151 Native Americans frequently attacked the 
settlers for possessing and taking ownership over their land, and in some 
instances to free enslaved Native Americans.152 Only twenty African 
slaves were first brought to Virginia in 1619; therefore, this group was 
not perceived as a threat.153 However, this number rapidly increased 
within the next few decades and, with it, the perceived need to control 
people who were Black via militia force and law.154 
Both Northern and Southern colonial governments were greatly con-
cerned with fighting off Native Americans, but they had a competing con-
cern: an armed and trained Black population. For example, in Massachu-
setts, freed slaves were prohibited from participating in militia drills, and 
instead were required to perform alternative service on public works pro-
jects.155 In New Jersey, Blacks were excused from compulsory militia ser-
vice.156 These colonies, however, did not expressly prohibit Blacks from 
being armed.157 In New York, a law passed in 1683 was even harsher; not 
only were Blacks and Native Americans prohibited from owning guns, 
but they were also prohibited from assembling in groups larger than four 
people.158 These laws were enforced by the militias that were organized 
by the colonial governments.159 
In the Southern colonies, there was an even greater concern regard-
ing Blacks’ access to arms. Because the Southern colonies had a larger 
Black population, the majority of which was enslaved, colonial govern-
ments and individual plantation owners feared slave rebellions.160 As 
such, the Southern colonies ensured by law that Blacks were disarmed.161 
In Virginia, for example, a statute enacted in 1680 prohibited all Blacks, 
free or enslaved, from possessing any type of weapon.162 Moreover, mili-
tias not only performed traditional military duties, but were also required 
to serve as patrollers who “ke[pt] order” within the slave populations.163 
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By law, militia detachments would report to patrol the slave plantations 
and living quarters.164 The militia and the slave patrol system were one 
organization.165 
During the early 1700s, laws in both the Northern and Southern col-
onies were enacted to further neutralize the possible threat of armed 
Blacks. For example, in Boston, a city with a strong militia presence to 
protect against the “near neighborhood of [Native Americans] and 
French,”166 enacted an ordinance that prohibited all Blacks, people who 
were multiracial, and Native Americans from carrying any weapons, 
meeting in groups larger than two people, and “from being on the streets 
from one hour after sundown until one hour before sunrise.”167 In South 
Carolina, slave owners were mandated by law to search the living quarters 
of slaves every fourteen days for weapons.168 
After the Revolutionary War, Congress ratified the Constitution, but 
without the Bill of Rights, which included the Second Amendment.169 Ar-
ticle I, section 8 granted certain powers to Congress, including the power 
to regulate a federal army and the state militias.170 The Framers set forth 
a dual system of state and federal government to regulate armed forces.171 
Each of the thirteen states would retain their right to maintain a militia, 
and their citizens would have the right to bear arms in the service of the 
militia.172 But, at the same time, the federal government could also call 
upon the militias for federal service and set the terms for how the militias 
were trained and armed.173 
Although the Constitution was ratified, many delegates were very 
concerned about the power that the federal government held over the state 
militias.174 Delegates feared that the federal government could use the 
Army as an oppressive force, and that the less equipped militias would be 
unable to protect the freedom of the states.175 Southern delegates feared 
what could result in a weaker militia system—indeed, the militias had 
prevented slave revolts and maintained the slavery institution.176 Delegate 
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Patrick Henry of Virginia, the largest state at the time, warned against 
vesting too much power in Congress, speculating that it would contribute 
to the end of slavery.177 He drew on the other delegates’ anxiety with the 
notion that Black men could be called to federal military service and 
thereafter made free.178 This apprehension that Blacks could be armed and 
trained rang true not only for the Southern delegates; at the time, the ma-
jority of states barred Black people, free or enslaved, from joining the 
militia, and some states prohibited Black people from owning any weap-
ons.179 Out of this lingering concern for the fate of state militias grew the 
Second Amendment.180 
After the Civil War and the official abolition of slavery, Southern 
states enacted Black Codes as a means to continue to oppress and subdue 
the Black population.181 Black Codes controlled Blacks’ employment by 
forcing them to enter labor contracts; Black people were unable to serve 
on juries or serve as witnesses against whites; vagrancy laws criminalized 
unemployment and idling.182 Of course, these Codes also prohibited 
Blacks from possessing firearms altogether or subjected them to licensing 
laws that whites did not need to follow.183 These Codes, which denied 
Blacks of their civil rights and “rendered [them] defenseless against as-
saults,”184 were what led to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the corre-
sponding Constitutional amendments. 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1868, states were 
required to amend their laws that prohibited Blacks from possessing fire-
arms or weapons.185 Southern states replaced their facially discriminatory 
gun laws with those that were facially race-neutral.186 Essentially, many 
Southern states enacted laws that prohibited the sale and ownership of 
particular classes of firearms, specifically handguns that were categori-
cally less expensive than other types of firearms—indeed, the only type 
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of firearm poor Blacks would have the financial means to purchase.187 
Similarly, some states made only costly firearms legal. For example, in 
1879, Tennessee passed a law “bann[ing] the sale of any pistol[] other 
than the expensive army or navy model revolvers.”188 Alabama, Texas, 
and Virginia employed tax laws to disarm the Black population, by im-
posing “exorbitant business or transaction taxes” on all firearms to ensure 
that Blacks would be unable to purchase such goods.189 Moreover, extra-
legal systems were established in some Southern jurisdictions, in which 
firearm retailers were mandated to report any firearm purchase by a Black 
person to the local police department.190 The sheriff would then arrest the 
buyer and confiscate the weapon.191 In 1906, Mississippi established a 
similar state-wide system when it enacted a law “requiring retailers to 
maintain records of all pistol and pistol ammunition sales, and to make 
such available to authorities for inspection.”192 These authorities and po-
lice department sheriffs were often members of the Ku Klux Klan 
(“KKK”).193 
During this time, in the early 1900s, World War I erupted and ended 
several years later. After the war, two major changes in this country oc-
curred. First, the Prohibition Era began and, with it, an increase in orga-
nized crime.194 Second, Black men returned from the war.195 Approxi-
mately 370,000 joined the Armed Forces during World War I.196 These 
men returned home both trained to use firearms and inspired to demand 
racial justice from the government that they had risked their lives to pro-
tect.197 Homecoming parades for the Black soldiers occurred in the North 
and South, with thousands of people present, creating a sense of racial 
pride.198 In February 1919, an all-Black army unit, the 369th Infantry Reg-
iment, marched into Harlem before nearly a quarter million onlookers.199 
This showing of self-dignity and defiance of the racial segregation and 
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violence endured by the soldiers prior to and throughout the war sparked 
a new surge of violence against Blacks.200 From 1918 to 1919, the number 
of lynchings increased by 30%, and eleven of the victims in 1919 were 
Black veterans.201 During this time, the KKK reemerged as a “major 
force” in the South.202 KKK groups also became more forceful in some 
non-Southern states, such as New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and 
Oregon.203 All five of these states enacted gun control laws between the 
years of 1913 and 1934.204 These new gun control laws, and those pre-
existing in Southern and some Northern states, ensured that Blacks had 
limited means of protection against this brutality.205 As discussed above, 
it was during this time in which the first federal “felon in possession” law 
was enacted—the Federal Firearms Act of 1938.206 
B. The Civil Rights Movement and the Increase in Gun Control Laws 
and Decrease of Protections Under the Fourth Amendment 
On October 22, 1968, President Johnson signed the Gun Control 
Act,207 the first federal Act making it a crime for persons previously con-
victed of a nonviolent felony to possess a firearm and/or ammunition.208 
This Act dramatically changed the federal laws that had existed before, as 
set out in the Federal Firearms Act of 1938.209 The timing of the enact-
ment of the Gun Control Act is quite telling; the government needed to 
maintain law and order in an environment where Blacks armed them-
selves and demanded civil rights. 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 was signed at the height of civil unrest 
and Black mobilization. In the South and other areas where the KKK ter-
rorized Black communities, Black individuals had no protection from lo-
cal authorities, and, in some instances, the local police departments aided 
the violence.210 Leaders, such as Martin Luther King, Jr., requested, to no 
avail, that President Kennedy send federal troops for security.211 Left with 
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no alternative, Black communities began forming groups and arming 
themselves with guns for self-defense. In 1964, the Deacons for Defense 
and Justice established itself in Louisiana.212 One Deacons for Defense 
and Justice group “obtained a charter and weapons, and vowed to shoot 
back if fired upon.”213 In 1965, the Lowndes County Freedom Organiza-
tion formed in Lowndes County, Alabama, which evolved into the Black 
Panther Party.214 
Using the political and organizational philosophies of the Lowndes 
County Freedom Organization, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale began the 
Black Panther Party in California in 1966.215 The Black Panthers opened 
up “survival programs” within Black communities, where members gave 
out free food and provided health services.216 Members would also mon-
itor police interactions with Black community members, primarily in 
Oakland, California.217 Panthers would follow police cars and provide ar-
rested Blacks with their Miranda rights.218 Panthers would usually carry 
unconcealed guns and law books during these interactions.219 Panthers 
would also hold protests and speak to crowds about police brutality.220 At 
the time, carrying an unconcealed weapon was not a crime in California 
and, in fact, was quite common.221 As such, to subdue the Panthers, police 
officers would frequently confiscate their weapons and charge them with 
disturbing the peace.222 Televisions and other mass-media outlets showed 
images of Black leaders shouting “Black Power!”223 Whites became 
frightened as the media suggested a Black violent revolution was on the 
horizon.224 
During the summer of 1967, there were over 100 riots across the 
country, including cities such as Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, 
Hartford, Minneapolis, Newark, New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, Tampa, and Washington D.C.225 The most violent riots oc-
curred in Newark, N.J., July 12 to 17; it is estimated that seventy-two 
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people were killed, 750 injured, and over 1,000 put in jail.226 In response 
to the Newark riots, over 3,000 National Guardsmen were dispatched.227 
The National Guardsmen went into predominantly Black neighborhoods 
and conducted house-to-house searches for firearms.228 
After these riots, three states passed new gun control laws in 1967. 
New York already regulated handguns but enacted a law that required 
registration for additional classes of guns.229 Illinois, which had not pre-
viously regulated the ownership of any class of gun, enacted a law that all 
owners of firearms obtain a gun license from the state police.230 In direct 
response to the efforts of the Panthers, the California Senate passed a law 
in late July 1967, which criminalized the possession of a loaded firearm 
in a vehicle or on the person in public place—but only within the limits 
of an “incorporated city.”231 The statute also provided that a police officer 
could “examine” the firearm “to determine whether or not [the] firearm 
[wa]s loaded for the purpose of enforcing this section.”232 The statute did 
not specify that the firearm needed to be visible and no requisite suspicion 
was required for the officer to initiate such examination.233 Panthers 
known to local police officers were frequently stopped and arrested under 
this statute after its enactment.234 
Due to the social unrest, large protests in cities, and mass-media im-
agery of armed Black militants, police departments and governments per-
ceived a need for greater crime control.235 Predominantly white police 
forces began heightening the patrolling of predominantly Black neighbor-
hoods, further aggravating suffering race relations and leading to more 
riots—specifically in response to police brutality.236 In the summer of 
1968, a riot began in Cleveland, Ohio, ending in a shootout between the 
police department and members of the Black Power movement.237 It was 
this same summer in which the U.S. Supreme Court held, for the first 
time, in Terry v. Ohio, that police officers could conduct a limited search 
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of a person absent probable cause.238 Specifically, the Court held that 
“there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search 
for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason 
to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, re-
gardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a 
crime.”239 
It was within this national social and legal context that the Gun Con-
trol Act of 1968 was enacted only several months after the Terry v. Ohio 
decision. Black communities demanded civil rights and protection from 
police brutality. White America and politicians feared an armed revolu-
tion. Police departments increased their patrol of Black communities to 
suppress riots and keep order. Several states passed gun control laws. Po-
lice officers could now legally search a person without probable cause—
with a mere reason to believe that the suspect was armed. The Gun Con-
trol Act was just another part of the government’s efforts to intensify “law 
and order,” disarm people who threatened this “order,” and in turn, further 
ensnare Blacks in the criminal justice system. 
C. The “War on Drugs,” Current Crime Control, and the Shaping of 
Today’s Federal Programs 
Not long after the enactment of the Gun Control Act of 1968, a new 
federal initiative began which shaped today’s reality of the disparate en-
forcement of federal firearm offenses, such as the federal “felon in pos-
session” law. A defining feature of the 1980’s was the “War on Drugs.”240 
During this time, federal initiatives “significantly increased federal pen-
alties for drug offenses and markedly increased federal funds for state 
anti-drug efforts.”241 Once the “War on Drugs” had commenced, the ra-
cial disparities between national and prison populations grew even 
greater. In 1985, Blacks made up 10% of the total national population but 
46% of the national state and federal prison population.242 This same year, 
whites made up 52% of the national state and federal prison population 
and 86% of the population.243 
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By 1994, after nine years of the “War on Drugs” raging on, the total 
state and federal prison population increased by over 100%,244 and the 
population of those imprisoned for drug offenses increased by approxi-
mately 300%.245 The national population, on the other hand, increased by 
only about 4% from 1990 to 1994.246 Over this time, the Black prison 
population had increased by 212% and that of white prisoners had gone 
up by 172%.247 In 1993-1994, Black individuals made up approximately 
11% of the national population but almost 50% of the state and federal 
prison population.248 Whites, on the other hand, made up approximately 
82% of the national population but a little over 50 % of the state and fed-
eral prison population.249 
Essentially, the “War on Drugs” shaped today’s reality of the dispar-
ate enforcement of federal firearm offenses by significantly increasing the 
number of Black people with felony convictions.250 As such, more Blacks 
can now be prosecuted under “felon in possession” laws. These felony 
convictions were not only for drug offenses, which were the target of the 
war on drugs, but for other offenses as well.251 As reported in FBI nation-
wide crime reports in 1995, the weapons arrest rate was five times greater 
for blacks than whites.252 Indeed, given the holding in Terry v. Ohio, an 
officer’s fear of a weapon may justify a search.253 This search thus can be 
a pretext to a search for other contraband and/or evidence of a crime.254 
These tactics continue today and Blacks continue to be disparately 
targeted by law enforcement. The Justice Department reported that in 
2011, Black drivers were 31% more likely to be stopped by an officer 
than a white driver.255 Moreover, prior to 2013, once stopped, officers 
were twice as likely to search the driver’s person and vehicle if the driver 
was Black.256 Beyond traffic stops, Blacks are also much more likely to 
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be stopped-and-frisked by police officers.257 These stops and searches, 
occurring at widely different rates for Blacks and whites, contribute to the 
widely different and disproportionate rates of incarceration for Black and 
white populations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
U.S. prison populations are the highest per capita in the world, and 
the racial make-up of the prison population is very disproportionate.258 If 
we seek to understand this disturbing phenomenon, we must look at un-
derlying causes and laws that allow for this occurrence. One source of this 
disproportionality is federal gun control laws. “Felon in possession” laws 
criminalize the status of being a felon, rather than harmful behavior. 
Given the slight evidence necessary to prove possession, as well as certain 
presumptions about possession, these laws are harsher than it would seem 
on their face. These laws are disparately enforced against Black defend-
ants, and federal initiatives that charge offenders in the federal rather than 
state system target Black communities. 
Due to the history of gun laws, the ways in which “felon in posses-
sion” laws have been drafted, interpreted, and enforced are not surprising. 
Since the first group of Africans were kidnapped and enslaved in this 
country, the state and federal governments established laws to disarm 
Black individuals in order to suppress rebellions, and later, movements 
for civil rights. The ghost of these past eras indeed does not lurk in the 
past. Gun control regimes—together with the colonial militia system—
began as a way to preserve the slavery system, and have morphed over 
the centuries into a way to preserve the hyper-criminalization and over-
incarceration of Black communities. 
Evidently, “felon in possession laws,” and their disparate effect on 
Black communities, are only a continuation of centuries of laws and law 
enforcement tactics enacted and employed to disarm Black people. This 
is distressing, and even more so knowing that legal challenges to this dis-
parate treatment are time and time again rejected by federal courts.259 It is 
also seemingly insurmountable. However, by identifying specific areas of 
law that contribute to the over-incarceration and hyper-criminalization of 
Black communities, we are one step further to understanding where legal 
challenges and increased efforts of defense are necessary. Moreover, by 
understanding the history of gun laws, and how these laws have pro-
gressed and have been altered to respond to shifts in legal initiatives and 
landscapes, we are better equipped to predict the ways in which gun laws 
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may be crafted to further criminalize Black communities, rather than im-
plemented to protect all communities against increasing gun violence.260 
Finally, with this two-pronged understanding—in tandem with an under-
standing of how past legal challenges have failed—we are further enabled 
to amend these challenges in new and creative ways, so these challenges 
can finally be successful. 
 
 
 260 Gun Death Rate Rises For Second Year in a Row, CBS NEWS (Nov. 6, 2017, 12:50 
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